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Introduction 
In this book l attempt to explore the question of what grounds are needed 
in order to justify respect for others. This question has become particularly 
pertinent in recent years as traditional liberal humanist foundations for re-
spect have been challenged on the basis that such universalist grounds have 
resulted in the exclusion of particular others from moral consideration or 
respect. The current questioning of the concept of universalism is, moreover, 
of enormous significance, given that universalism has been one of the central 
assumptions of modern Western philosophy and a foundational key to its 
moral and political theory. Jn chapter I 1 outline the reasons why such a cri-
tique has come about historically, focusing specifically on the ways in which 
Western philosophy has been seen to fail in regards to both the scope of its 
application, its justificatory grounds regarding universal moral consideration, 
and in its apparent dichotomy between the individual and the community. 
It should be stressed that this is only a presentation of the standard or non-
nuanced account of Western philosophy-as opposed to a critical appraisal 
of this standard account-for it is this standard interpretation, while at times 
a philosophical straw-man, which has continued to persist and which has pro-
vided much of the impetus to the wholesale rejection of universal humanism. 
I then engage with the recent posthumanist challenges to universal con-
cepts of human being in detail, firstly at a broad theoretical level in chapter 
2, where I explore the work of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jean-
Frarn;ois Lyotard, and then at an applied level in chapter 3, as posthumanist 
scholars seek to apply such theories to particular instances of marginalization 
and oppression. In this chapter I discuss the issue of indigeneity, which is 
explored in relation to the work of Bill Readings and Manahuia Barcham and 
the political claims of Indigenous Australians. Also in chapter 3 I address 
the issue of gender, which is explored through the work of Judith Butler and 
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Donna Haraway. While posthumanists have objected to Western philosophy 
on a number of different grounds, one of their major objections to universal-
ism has been its exclusion or marginalization of difference, and as such, these 
theories can be seen as arguments for particularism, for the recognition of
difference over sameness. I argue that posthumanist critiques of universal-
ist assumptions within humanism are themselves based on unacknowledged 
ethical assumptions of universal value and respect for others. As these as-
sumptions are implied rather than explicitly justified, they become reliant 
upon the rhetorical force of their arguments alone, leaving justification for 
respect for others without any logical or arguable foundation and therefore 
highly vulnerable to the contingencies of social persuasion and sentiment. 
For, in explicitly eschewing any metaphysical grounds for respect, posthu-
manist scholars fail to provide any grounds as to why we should, or ought, to 
respect others at all. 
Following the discussion in the first three chapters, I conclude that some 
form of universalism is needed to ground respect for the particular, in order to 
justify why we should respect others. In the next three chapters I then explore 
current re-conceptualizations of universal moral consideration. 
In chapter 4 I discuss the current challenges to the grounds and scope 
of traditional liberal humanism through utilitarian-based arguments for the 
inclusion of animals within the scope of moral consideration, looking in par-
ticular at the theories of philosophers Peter Singer, David DeGrazia, and Jeff 
McMahan, along with Cora Diamond and Eva Feder Kittay. While classic 
utilitarian arguments regarding pain and pleasure (or preferences) are used 
to provide a universal standard of measurement in regards to moral consid-
eration for both animals and humans, I will argue that not only does such a 
scale create new exclusions of particular humans, but that utilitarian theory 
still fails to provide satisfactory grounds as to why we should care about the 
pain or pleasure of others-in other words, why we ought to respect others. 
In chapter 5 I examine current arguments by scholars who work within 
the liberal humanist tradition but from a critical standpoint, including such 
scholars as Jeff Noonan, Stephen Darwall, Christine Korsgaard and Martha 
Nussbaum. These scholars attempt to address the issues of exclusion that 
have arisen from the universalist tradition by either re-conceptualizing tradi-
tional grounds for respect or by broadening the scope of moral consideration 
to those traditionally excluded from such consideration, such as animals and 
non-rational humans. Again, I shall suggest here that the issue of justification 
for the respect for others is still not adequately conceptualized, showing that 
such approaches, which emphasize self-determination, rationality, autonomy 
and/or intuition, fall short either in regard to their justificatory grounds or 
scope of moral inclusion. It is in this chapter that the concept of account-
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ability, touched upon in earlier chapters, begins to be more fully considered 
regarding its role within ethics and human being, a role that I argue to be 
foundational in the next and final chapter, chapter 6. 
ln chapter 6 r conclude that an ontological understanding of human being 
is needed to provide an adequate foundation for the justification of respect for 
others. Such a foundation, albeit partial in its conception, is offered; one that 
emphasizes a communal, as opposed to an atomistic, conception of human 
being that seeks to balance the tension between particularism and univer-
sal ism by showing a common structure of human ethical practice that does 
not occlude difference. I suggest that this common structure is the universal 
human practice of communal accountability, which is inextricably linked to 
communal standards of value and justice. As such, communal practices can 
be seen to be foundational to both human being and ethics and I conclude 
that they provide the universal grounds needed in order to justify respect for 
others. 
Before starting, however, it is important to clarify some of the terms used 
here and throughout the book. For a number of reasons, the term "posthu-
manism" will be used rather than "postmodernism" or "poststructuralism"; 
first, because the one term-posthumanism-is less unwieldy than the two; 
secondly, because the term more accurately reflects the issues highlighted in 
this book (i.e., the universalist assumptions in humanism rather than modern-
ism or structuralism); thirdly, because the scholars often referred to by such 
terms (Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jean-Frarn;ois Lyotard), have 
either distanced themselves from their use or simply not used them at all; and 
finally, because current scholars working within this tradition have begun to 
use the term posthumanism in relation to their own work. 
The term "accountability" is used in the sense of being accountable to lrn-
man beings if or when we injure them in some way-and conversely, they 
injure us-rather than in the sense of the accountability we may have, say, 
to our employers concerning our conditions of employment. As Stephen 
Darwall puts it, both a sense of injury, personal worth and an expectation of 
accountability are implicit in the cry "Hey, you can't do that to me!"1-al-
though it will be argued later that accountability can be assumed both on be-
half of others and on an intercommunal basis, as opposed to Darwall's more 
individual conception. 
That which distinguishes ethics from merely prudential or practical consid-
erations, as Jeff Malpas points out, is that ethics is essentially concerned with 
human worth: "what marks out the questions of ethics are just those questions 
that concern the propriety of actions inasmuch as those actions affect our own 
worth as human beings or as persons."2 In this sense, the term 'respect' in this 
book is directly linked to the recognition of accountability; as intrinsic to the 
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suggestion that some humans are unworthy of equal moral consideration is 
the denial of accountability toward such humans. Denial of accountability is, 
therefore, a denial of respect, just as the recognition of accountability is the 
recognition of respect; for, as I shall be suggesting later, implicit in such rec-
ognition is the acknowledgement that human beings are ends in themselves. 
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